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Abstract
In the past decade East Asia has taken steps to increase regional integration. This paper examines
the vogue for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently raging in China and Japan. After mapping
the regional links that knit East Asia together during the 1990s and 2000s, the focus then shifts to
the speciﬁc trade agreements that China and Japan have signed. Both countries exhibit a particular
FTA “style;” Japan has adopted a more orthodox and comprehensive approach to its treaties, while
China has shown greater ﬂexibility and gradualism when dealing with FTA partners. It is still
unclear whether these eﬀorts will lead to a region-wide FTA, or a continued crisscrossing of bilateral
arrangements. In either case, China’s eagerness to adapt to partner country expectations likely gives
it an edge in becoming the regional hub of East Asia.
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1. Introduction
Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rapidly proliferated in the new millennium.
Countries on all six continents have signed FTAs, ﬁrst with immediate neighbours, and then farther abroad. The notion of a contiguous trade bloc – such as
the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN) – has been unhinged. In direct to these larger free trade areas, bilateral
FTAs have sprung up in many parts of the world.
Even in East Asia, one of the least integrated areas in the world, an FTA race is
under way. In the new millennium, a spate of bilateral FTAs has yoked East Asia’s
largest economies – China, Japan, Korea and Singapore – with countries on various continents, mostly in Asia. East Asia’s ﬁrst FTA, the 2002 Japan-Singapore
New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement, has literally ushered in a new age. In
search of FTA partners, these countries now scour the Asia-Paciﬁc and beyond.
*) The author thanks Professors Karel Wellens, Andrew Lang and other participants of The New
International Law, University of Oslo and Professors Linda Yueh, Patrick Gustavsson and the other
participants of China, Law and Economic Growth, Stockholm School of Economics.
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This paper compares Chinese and Japanese approaches to FTA diplomacy.
Korea and Singapore, important contributors to the East Asian FTA picture, lie
outside the scope of this inquiry. Part 2 recounts the aﬃliations that knit East
Asia together during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly the achievements of the
Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN. This background
sheds light on the events, motivations and actors animating the current FTA
surge. Part 3 recounts the ongoing FTA surge in East Asia. Sparked by Western
protectionism and frustration with fruitless World Trade Organization (WTO)
negotiations, East Asian countries have also embraced the global vogue for FTAs.
Part 4 analyses East Asian FTAs as examples of international economic law.
Though still early in their FTA trajectories, Chinese and Japanese FTAs nonetheless show discernible dispositions. Japan prefers comprehensive, “Western-style”
arrangements, aiming to capture the entire agreement in a single document.
China has taken a diﬀerent approach, incorporating into its FTAs both Western
and Asian legal principles.

2. Regional Integration: The Early Years
East Asian economic integration is not happening in a vacuum, but along paths
well trod during the 1990s. The present FTA surge retraces the regional architecture laid out during the 1990s. First, regional bodies such as ASEAN and APEC
created fora in which East Asian states could discuss and help shape international
economic policy. Building on this experience, also known as socialisation, China
and Japan have developed methods to integrate their economies into the region.
By looking at regional bodies, and then China’s and Japan’s speciﬁc regionalisation
eﬀorts, we gain critical insight into today’s FTA mania.
2.1. Institutions: ASEAN and APEC
2.1.1. ASEAN
Like the European Union, the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations responded to a broad array of political, strategic and economic concerns.1
But unlike the EU or other Western arrangements, the group operates informally and
consensually. Historically, it has not made decisions legally binding upon members,2

1)

C. S. Yue, ‘Regionalism and Subregionalism in ASEAN: The Free Trade Area and Growth
Triangle Models’, in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger (eds.), Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade
Arrangements (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997) p. 285.
2)
S. Choi, Regionalism and Open Regionalism in the APEC Region (Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore, 2004) p. 14.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665126

T. Webster / Nordic Journal of International Law 77 (2008) 301–318

303

preferring instead to operate along the “ASEAN Way” of informality, repeated
consultations and consensus-building.3
Initially, ASEAN focused mainly on political issues: the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes, and the promotion of regional stability.4 These aims and the
resultant peace have, of course, contributed signiﬁcantly to the economic stability
and success of Southeast Asia.5 But only in the wake of economic integration
elsewhere in the world did free trade surface onto the ASEAN agenda.6
While ASEAN has enjoyed modest success in economic integration,7 its
primary contribution to regional integration lies outside the economic realm,
and outside of Southeast Asia for that matter. ASEAN is the centre of gravity
for this part of the world, rarer still in being comprised solely of Asian states.
It continues to inspire trust in the region; often the latest Asian initiative
began as a highly successful ASEAN one. The ASEAN Regional Forum and
the “ASEAN Plus Three” (APT) framework exemplify this trend. Both fora
have linked China, Japan and Korea with Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent
with each other.
2.1.2. APEC
Like ASEAN, the Asian Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation oﬀers proof that regionalism in some parts of the world triggers regionalism elsewhere.8 The late 1980s
witnessed two regional shifts that alarmed unaﬃliated Paciﬁc states, notably
Australia and Japan. First, the European Union advanced from a tightly knit
customs union to an even more protectionist Single Market in the late 1980s.
Second, the 1989 creation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (later
NAFTA) further raised the protectionist barriers to unaﬃliated states. Seeking to
buﬀet global waves by addressing regional issues, APEC has served as a sounding
board, but not much else.
3)

See P. J. Davidson, ‘ASEAN Features: The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic
Cooperation’, 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law (2004) p. 165; F. Liu, ‘East Asian
Regionalism: Theoretical Perspectives’, in F. Liu and P. Régnier (eds.), Regionalism in East Asia:
Paradigm Shifting? (RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003) p. 22.
4)
Yue, supra note 1, p. 285.
5)
S. Harris, ‘Asian Multilateral Institutions and Their Response to the Asian Economic Crisis: The
Regional and Global Implications’, in Shaun Breslin et al. (eds.), New Regionalisms in the Global
Political Economy (University of Warwick, Warwick, 2000) p. 127.
6)
See Yue, supra note 1, p. 287.
7)
See ASEAN, The ASEAN Free Trade Area, available at <www.aseansec.org/12021.htm> (noting
that the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has eliminated intra-regional tariﬀs on more than 99 percent of goods traded between the so-called ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand) and on nearly 80 percent of goods traded between the four less developed
members (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam)).
8)
J. Ravenhill, ‘A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism’, 2 International Relations of
the Asia-Paciﬁc (2002) p. 177.
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From its inception, APEC aimed to liberalise trade in a soft, aspirational
manner. It began “with no organizational framework”,9 nor an exclusivity requirement. Part of its haphazard nature lies in the fact that many original members
were already party to other FTAs.10 And perhaps indicative of its partially Asian
constituency, it did not employ legally binding strictures to do so.
Given their diﬀerent levels of development, geopolitical ambitions and interest
in regionalisation, China and Japan have had diverse roles in APEC. China,
though not a founding member, has been a comparatively active one. Initially,
APEC provided China a voice in regional aﬀairs it could not have at the global
level.11 The organisation’s non-binding, non-intrusive nature did not threaten
China’s zealously guarded sovereignty, and appealed to its hesitant approach to
international organisations. At the same time, its economic agenda acculturated
China to the new global dictates of lower tariﬀs, free movements of capital and
deregulation.
Japan, in keeping with its relatively low proﬁle in regional aﬀairs, has been a
lacklustre participant in APEC.12 Though instrumental in establishing APEC,
and setting its initial agendas,13 Japan has since receded from prominence. One
critic suggested that Japan had been marginalised into the role of mediator
between the unilateral US, with its insistence on free trade, and the wider AsianPaciﬁc community, which seeks broader cooperation in economic aﬀairs.14 There
may be some truth to the interpretation, but that does not burnish the rather dim
view of Japan’s regional leadership.
2.2. National Eﬀorts
2.2.1. China: Dense Institutionalism
Since the end of the Cold War, China has spun a dense organisational web around
itself in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and to a lesser extent East Asia. China’s relationship with ASEAN, for instance, has expanded in several directions. In 1991,

9)
A. Yanai, ‘Characteristics of APEC Trade Liberalization: A Comparative Analysis with the WTO’,
in J. Okamoto (ed.), Trade Liberalization and APEC (RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2004) p. 13.
10)
APEC initially comprised the six ASEAN states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand), Canada and the US (then parties to the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CUSFTA)), Australia and New Zealand (then parties to the Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZERTA)) and Korea and Japan.
11)
J. Shen, ‘China & APEC: Regionalization from China’s Domestic Perspective’, in B. Hettne
(ed.), The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development (Palgrave Macmillan,
Hampshire, UK, 2000) p. 257.
12)
See S. J. Maswood, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and Regionalism’, in S. J. Maswood (ed.), Japan and
East Asian Regionalism (Routledge, London, 2001) p. 9.
13)
C. M. Dent, ‘Regionalism & Inter-regional Co-operation’, in C. M. Dent (ed.), The European
Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship (Routledge, London, 1999) p. 222.
14)
See Maswood, supra note 12, p. 19.
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China aﬃliated with ASEAN by becoming a consultative partner at the ASEAN
Post-Ministerial Conference. In 1994, China announced its intention to take up
security issues by joining the annual ASEAN Regional Forum.15 China further
deepened the relationship in 1997, pioneering the ASEAN Plus One framework,
which Japan and Korea quickly emulated, creating ASEAN Plus Three. Though
only an informal addition to annual ASEAN meetings, the APT may be the only
forum in which oﬃcials from East and Southeast Asia, but nowhere else, convene
to discuss international aﬀairs.16
China’s relationship with ASEAN has created trust throughout the region.
In November 2002, China acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia (TAC-SEA), and thereby agreed to “resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means”.17 This allayed China’s coastal neighbours,
especially the Philippines and Vietnam, which have outstanding disputes with
China over island chains in the South China Sea.18 In addition, China and ASEAN
further committed themselves to cooperate in the realms of economics, politics
and security in the October 2003 Joint Declaration on Peace and Prosperity.19
China has also established its own regional initiatives,20 most notably the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This grew out of the “Shanghai Five”,
an agreement signed by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan for
the purposes of “conﬁdence-building in the military sphere” and “mutual reduction of military forces in border areas”.21 Over time, the countries have committed
themselves to non-military threats, such as arms smuggling, drug-traﬃcking and
religious extremism,22 and lately toward economic cooperation, energy and trade.
China has thus carefully sculpted a credible, and peaceable, regional proﬁle.
2.2.2. Japan: Regional Production Networks
On the whole, Japan has been a tepid regionalist. Recent events suggest a more
dynamic regional policy, but for most of the post-War period, Japanese integration
15)
See ASEAN Regional Forum, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of the People’s Republic of China,
5 August 2002, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/t15313.htm>.
16)
See H. De Santis, ‘The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism’, 23 World Policy
Journal (Summer 2005) pp. 27–28.
17)
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 November 2002, Article 4.
18)
De Santis, supra note 16, p. 24 (noting Chinese contestation of the Spratly Islands, with
Vietnam, and Mischief Reef, with the Philippines).
19)
Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,
8 October 2003.
20)
China also plays important roles in the Kunming Initiative, which fosters economic ties between
China and South Asia, and the Greater Mekong Sub-region, which improves infrastructure in
China and Southeast Asia.
21)
Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Co-operation Organization, 15 June 2001, Article 6.
22)
‘Five-Nation Joint Statement Stresses Further Cooperation in Regional Security’, People’s Daily
Online, 26 August 1999.
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eﬀorts were limited to the economy. Of course, the Japanese private sector and
government have poured money into Southeast Asia, China, Korea and Taiwan.23
The twin arms of governmental oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) and corporate foreign direct investment (FDI) created transnational production lines
that now snake across East and Southeast Asia.24
Japanese engagement with Asia stretches back to its colonial period, the Paciﬁc
War and the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the War, Japan
invested in the natural resources and manufacturing sectors of several Asian
neighbours,25 a tendency that continues until the present. With the re-evaluation of
the yen in 1985, investment in Asia soared; the amount of investment between 1986
and 1989 surpassed the entire amount of investment between 1951 and 1985.26
When the cost of manufacturing goods in the Japanese archipelago grew too
expensive, automobile and electronics manufacturers oﬀshored their production
facilities to Southeast Asia. In any given Honda, for instance, one might ﬁnd an
Indonesian engine, Malaysian fenders, Thai clutches and a Filipino transmission.27
A similar transnational eﬀort converges to produce a Panasonic television.28
These networks created a buﬀer zone for Japanese corporations as they faced
increasingly severe competition from globalisation and Euro-American protectionism. By the end of the millennium, in the eyes of one observer, “Japanese
political and business elites viewed the entire [Asian] region … as one organic
unit, or what the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) began to
call ‘a soft cooperation network’”.29 This soft network had the added beneﬁt of
keeping a large number of white collar jobs for Japanese executives, who relocated
to Southeast Asia in order to oversee the production facilities.30 It also permitted
the transfer of certain technologies from Japan to Southeast Asia, though this has
not signiﬁcantly spurred the capacity for technological innovation in the latter.31
Despite these achievements, Japan has shown little interest in regionalisation
outside of the economic realm. This may reﬂect in part Japan’s unique relationship
23)
G. D. Hook, ‘Japan’s Role in the East Asian Political Economy: An Emerging Region?’, in G. D. Hook
and H. Harukiyo (eds.), The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization (Routledge, London, 2001) p. 49.
24)
T. Shiraishi, ‘Japan & Southeast Asia’, in P. J. Katzenstein and T. J. Pempel (eds.), Network
Power: Japan and East Asia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997) p. 187.
25)
R. F. Doner, ‘Japan in East Asia: Institutions and Regional Leadership’, in Katzenstein and
Pempel, ibid., p. 203.
26)
Ibid., p. 212.
27)
Ibid., p. 214.
28)
T. Morris-Suzuki, ‘Japanese Technology and the New International Division of Knowledge in
Asia’, in S. Tokunaga (ed.), Japan’s Foreign Investment & Asian Economic Interdependence: Production,
Trade & Financial Systems (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1992) p. 143.
29)
See W. Hatch, ‘Regionalization Trumps Globalization: Japanese Production Networks in Asia’,
in R. Stubbs and G. R. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy & The Changing Global Order (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2000) p. 387.
30)
Ibid., p. 390.
31)
See Morris-Suzuki, supra note 28, p. 145.
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with the United States, which has forced Japan to take a more limited stance in
international aﬀairs generally and security arrangements in particular. Nonetheless,
Japan has been free to pursue other forms of integration, whether in the spheres
of politics, monetary integration or culture.
Japan’s recently assertive FTA strategy in one way deviates from this low proﬁle.
But it is vitally predicated upon these economic foundations; Japanese investment
and aid in Southeast Asia have given it a leg up in negotiating agreements with
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

3. FTA Surge
The new FTA boom has roots stretching back to the late 1980s. With the passage
of the Single Market in Europe, and NAFTA in North America, protectionism
ﬂourished. Asia’s two largest export markets, Europe and North America, were
now considerably more diﬃcult to penetrate. Southeast Asia responded in kind,
forming its own regional trade agreement in 1992. China, Japan and Korea, on
the other hand, initially lacked the diplomatic networks, mutual trust and institutional background that would permit such arrangements. After a decade or so of
network building, these countries have entered an FTA boom. Since 2002, China
and Japan have each signed three FTAs with countries in Asia and the Americas.
Here we examine these arrangements, and then turn to future prospects.
3.1. China: Diversity and Conformity
China has signed Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPAs) with
Hong and Macao, and FTAs with ASEAN, Chile and Pakistan.32 It is in late
stages of negotiation with both Australia and New Zealand, and has begun talks
with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Singapore and the Southern Africa Customs
Union. It has even conducted a feasibility study with distant Iceland,33 and
announced its intention to begin negotiations with Korea.34 Chinese interest in
free trade thus extends far beyond its immediate neighbours in the Asia-Paciﬁc,
though that continues to be the important locus in its FTA policy.
This section examines the four agreements (three foreign, one internal) China
has signed. In addition to trade in goods and services, Chinese FTAs promote deeper
economic integration through investment measures, protection of intellectual

32)

See ‘China to advance bilateral, regional free trade negotiation’, China View, 15 September
2006, at <news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-09/15/content_5097127.htm>.
33)
Ibid.
34)
See ‘China, ROK agree to start negotiations on free trade area’, People’s Daily Online, 14 October
2006, <english.people.com.cn/200610/14/eng20061014_311722.html>.
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property rights, mutual recognition of standards, harmonisation of custom
procedures, and so on.35 At the same time, it should be noted that China has
not taken a cookie-cutter, one-size-ﬁts-all approach to FTAs. Rather, with each
new arrangement, China has proven itself to be ﬂexible, dynamic and even conciliatory. This makes it a desirable and dependable trading partner for countries
throughout the region, and perhaps the world.
3.1.1. Prelude: Hong Kong and Macao
In line with its gradualist approach to opening up to the outside world, China
began its free trade journey with the quasi-autonomous territories of Hong Kong
and Macao. The CEPAS, which brought the former colonies closer into the
Chinese fold, marked tentative steps toward freer bilateral trade.36 The agreement
aims to “promote the joint economic prosperity and development” of China and
Hong Kong, while facilitating “further development of economic links between
the two sides and other countries and regions”.37 Thus, China viewed this initial
arrangement not only as a way of reinforcing economic links with Hong Kong
and Macao, but also as a harbinger of China’s next rounds of FTAs.
China’s ﬁrst trade liberalisation scheme covered a fairly typical range of topics:
trade in goods, trade in services and investment facilitation. For goods, Hong
Kong merely maintained its zero-tariﬀ rate on goods from China. China, for its
part, phased out tariﬀs on goods originating in Hong Kong between 2004 and
1 January 2006.38
Trade in services covers various sectors, from the conventional (advertising,
accounting, telecommunications, insurance) to the rarer (tourism, legal services,
recognition of professional qualiﬁcations).39 Given Hong Kong’s status as a major
ﬁnancial hub, cooperation in banking and securities was of particular importance. The agreement a) permits state-owned banks to locate their international
treasury and foreign exchange centres to Hong Kong; b) allows for mainland
insurance companies, and other private enterprises, to list on the Hong Kong
stock exchange; and c) calls for greater cooperation and information sharing
between ﬁnancial regulators.40 Quite understandably, China wants to draw on
Hong Kong’s expertise to build a sophisticated ﬁnancial sector. Moreover, China
35)

R. S. Rajan, ‘Trade Liberalization and the New Regionalism in the Asia-Paciﬁc: Taking Stock of
Recent Events’, 5 International Relations of the Asia Paciﬁc (2005) p. 221.
36)
China signed CEPAs with Hong Kong on 29 June 2003, and with Macao on 17 October 2003.
Since the agreements are essentially the same, the focus here is on the Hong Kong CEPA.
37)
Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (hereinafter CEPA),
29 June 2003, Preamble.
38)
Ibid., Article 5.
39)
See generally CEPA Annex 4, Speciﬁc Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Services.
40)
CEPA, Article 13.
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expects that Hong Kong service-providers and professionals will train Chinese
workers in these new ﬁelds.41
Of course, certain provisions reﬂect the unique status of China vis-à-vis Hong
Kong, and have not been duplicated in other agreements. One such innovation
allows Chinese residents of Guangdong Province (on Hong Kong’s northern
border) to visit Hong Kong on special tourist visas.42 More apropos trade, Hong
Kong and China have agreed to do away with anti-dumping measures.43 From its
very ﬁrst free trade agreement, China has exhibited a degree of innovativeness,
but also a willingness to take advantage of the unique features of the bilateral
relationship. This adaptability manifests itself repeatedly.
3.1.2. China-Asian Free Trade Agreement
As described above, China actively cultivated better relations with its Southeast
Asian neighbours throughout the 1990s. By attending various ASEAN meetings,
cooperating on security issues and developing a code of conduct for disputes in
the South China Sea, China demonstrated its trustworthiness to the various
members of ASEAN.44
This strategy has also had a signiﬁcant economic component. Premier Zhu
Rongji proposed the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2001.
In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed a loosely worded Framework
Agreement with the multiple aims of: strengthening economic, trade and investment cooperation; liberalising and promoting trade in goods and services; exploring new areas for closer economic cooperation; and facilitating the economic
integration of the least developed ASEAN members.45 As with the Hong Kong
CEPA, this agreement introduces several FTA innovations.
The Framework Agreement itself oﬀers only the barest of skeletons, leaving the
task of elaboration to subsequent agreements and annexes; CAFTA does not so
much declare as unfold a constant work in progress. This in itself comes as
an innovation, reﬂecting concepts that scholars identify with Asian diplomacy
generally: informality, incrementalism and minimalism.46 Rather than grandiose

41)

A. Antkiewicz and J. Whalley, ‘China’s New Regional Trade Agreements’, 11 National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper 10992 (2004).
42)
CEPA, Article 14.
43)
Ibid., Article 7.
44)
J. Wanandi, ‘China and Asia Paciﬁc Regionalism’, in K. Ryosei and J. Wang (eds.), The Rise of
China and a Changing East Asian Order (Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, 2004)
pp. 44, 45.
45)
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter Framework Agreement),
5 November 2002, Article 1.
46)
See Liu, supra note 3, pp. 20–22.
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plans or dramatic breakthroughs, CAFTA has come into existence gradually,
annex-by-annex, as a chain of modest steps. ASEAN diplomacy typically operates
in the following way: issues are discussed; a level of agreement on certain (but not
all) issues is attained; a memorial sets forth the mutual understanding; parties
reconvene a year later to continue discussions.
This gradualism seems to be working. The Agreement on Trade in Goods, the
ﬁrst annex to the Framework Agreement, entered into force in 2005.47 It calls
for the gradual reduction of tariﬀs by 2010 for the more developed members
of ASEAN, and 2015 for the less developed members.48 By that time, over
90 percent of trade between ASEAN and China will be tariﬀ-free,49 liberalising
“substantially all trade” within a decade.50
The ﬁrst installation of the Agreement on Trade in Goods focused on agriculture. With the Early Harvest Program,51 China and several members of ASEAN
agreed to slash tariﬀs on 600 agricultural products beginning in 2004, eliminating them altogether by 2006.52 Signiﬁcantly, China takes the lead by lowering its
tariﬀs before many of its ASEAN partners follow suit.53 By all accounts, this has
been a success for China and ASEAN; in just one year, Chinese agricultural
imports from ASEAN grew 46.6 percent, and exports grew 31.2 percent.54 This
has generated optimism on both sides for continued tariﬀ reductions in other
goods.
Since 2002, CAFTA has been ﬂeshed out with additional agreements: the
Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement (2003);55 a Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (2004);56 a Plan of Action for Information Technology (2007);57 and
47)
Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of
China, 29 November 2004.
48)
Ibid., Preamble.
49)
See PRC Ministry of Foreign Commerce, Minister Bo Xilai Answering Questions of the Press on
China-ASEAN FTA, <boxilai2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/speech/200608/20060802846310.html>.
50)
By agreeing to free up substantially all trade, China and ASEAN acknowledge the standards
articulated, though rarely enforced, by the WTO.
51)
See ‘China-ASEAN Agriculture Trade on Fast Track’, China Daily, 9 August 2004, <china.org
.cn/english/BAT/103399.htm>.
52)
Ibid.
53)
A. Greenwald, ‘Note: The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA): A Legal Response to
China’s Economic Rise?’, 16 Duke Journal Comparative and International Law (2006) p. 198.
54)
Minister Bo Xilai Answering Questions, supra note 49.
55)
Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation
Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, 6 October
2003.
56)
Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s
Republic of China, 29 November 2004.
57)
Plan of Action to Implement the Beijing Declaration on ASEAN-China ICT Cooperative
Partnership for Common Development, 14 January 2007.
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most recently a Service Trade Agreement.58 Some of these, such as the Amendment
Protocol, contain an elaborate list of procedures, contrasting quite markedly with
the heavily schematic Framework Agreement. It is tempting to call such additions
“Western” in their desire to capture every imaginable contingency. Nevertheless,
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement retains a gradualism and informality
unique among FTAs.
3.1.3. Outward Bound: Chine-Chile Free Trade Agreement
On 1 October 2006, the ﬁrst part of the China-Chile FTA went into eﬀect.59
China adapted to Chile’s largely Western standards, entering into an agreement of
121 articles, and 62 pages in English, making it much longer than the CAFTA
(23 pages, 16 articles) and CEPA agreements (11 pages, 23 articles). Without a
long history of trade relations, China and Chile elected a comprehensive package
ab initio, minimising ambiguity and clearly illuminating all details. China can thus
modulate between the keys of Western formalism and Asian incrementalism.
Between 2007 and 2017, China and Chile will progressively eliminate tariﬀs
on 97 percent of tariﬀ lines.60 In the ﬁrst cut, already in eﬀect, China eliminated
tariﬀs on 28 percent of its tariﬀ lines, while Chile eliminated them on 43 percent
of its tariﬀ lines.61 The ﬁrst round of tariﬀ reduction focuses on agricultural
products, chemicals, textiles and electronics.62 Most importantly for resourcechallenged China, copper is also included.
In keeping with the larger trend, the China-Chile FTA extends beyond goods
and services. It addresses fair competition, diversiﬁcation of trade and dispute
resolution.63 In other words, procedure is a critical component to this agreement,
and proceeds in elaborate detail.
3.1.4. Investing in the West: Chinese-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement
Unlike CAFTA, the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA)64 did not
spring from a long courtship between the two countries; it took just 18 months

58)

See Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, China and ASEAN Signed the
Service Trade Agreement, 16 January 2007, <english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/ cameetings/
lanmuc/200701/20070104275170.html>.
59)
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Chile (hereinafter CCFTA), 18 November 2005.
60)
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Sino-Chilean Free Trade Agreement to
be Enforced as of Oct. 1, 3 September 2006, <english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/signiﬁ
cantnews200609/20060903198707.html>.
61)
See ‘China, Chile put free trade agreement into eﬀect’, China View, 1 October 2006, <news
.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/01/content_5161337.htm>.
62)
Ibid.
63)
CCFTA, Article 2.
64)
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter CPFTA), 24 November 2006.
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and six rounds of talks.65 While Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations have been
warm for most of their contemporary history 66 (both states were founded in
the late 1940s), the FTA still seemed a surprise. China’s regionalisation eﬀorts
had focused primarily on Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent on Central Asia.
The CPFTA attests to both China’s newfound desire to be a regional leader, and
Pakistan’s keen appetite for foreign investment and technology.
The CPFTA is not expansive, covering trade in goods and services and investment. It takes an extremely ﬂexible approach toward tariﬀ reduction, dividing
tariﬀs into ﬁve categories, each with a diﬀerent percentage reduction and implementation deadline.67 Periodic tariﬀ reviews, including one “at the end of the fourth
year or at the beginning of the ﬁfth year”, ensure that implementing future tariﬀ
schemes will not damage either side. The agreement states that both sides “shall
endeavor” to eliminate 90 percent of the tariﬀ lines, but only spells out the reduction of 85 percent of the tariﬀ lines.68 Flexibility seems the operative word here.69
In addition, CPFTA slakes some of Pakistan’s thirst for foreign investment.70
It provides protection to Chinese investors in Pakistan, which has already led
Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan’s industry and infrastructure.71 The ﬁrst
signs are already visible.72 In this light, free trade seems a distant afterthought to
the imminent realisation of ﬁnancial cooperation. China is steadily cementing its
position as a regional power.
3.2. Japan: Scratching Beneath the Surface
In contrast to China’s newfound enthusiasm for FTAs, Japan has a longer and
more contested history with them. During the Uruguay Rounds of the WTO,
Japanese delegates aimed to minimise the “adverse eﬀects” of FTAs; they wanted
the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) to provide discipline to the
65)
See ‘China, Pakistan sign free trade agreement’, People’s Daily Online, 24 November 2006,
<english.peopledaily.com.cn/200611/24/eng20061124_324918.html>.
66)
See Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Key Developments in Sino-Pakistani
Relations, 25 November 2006, <english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/cnpkfta/ lanmub/200611/
20061103886177.html>.
67)
Category I tariﬀs will be reduced to zero by 2010. Category II tariﬀs will be reduced to 5 percent
or below by 2012. Category III tariﬀs will be reduced to 50 percent by 2012. Category IV tariﬀs will
be reduced 20 percent by 2012. Category V tariﬀs will remain as they are. See CPFTA, Annex 1,
Elimination of Import Customs Duties.
68)
Ibid.
69)
Indeed, it provides for maximal ﬂexibility by permitting either party to terminate the agreement
within six months of notifying the other. CPFTA, Article 82.
70)
See ‘China, Pakistan to Ink Free Trade Deal’, CBS/AP, 23 November 2006.
71)
CPFTA, Articles 46–56.
72)
Twenty Chinese companies have committed to invest in the Pakistan-China Industrial Zone.
See S. Fazl-e-Haider, ‘Chinese eye Pakistan’s real estate’, Asia Times Online, 17 January 2007, <www
.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IA17Df03.html>.
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formation and regulation of FTAs.73 Until quite recently, Japan had staunchly
advocated multilateral trade.
In the new millennium, however, Japan’s fear of being excluded from the “global FTA game” has led to a realignment of its international economic policies.74
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MOFA) captures this change with paradoxical brevity: “FTAs increase Japan’s bargaining power in WTO negotiations.”75
Needless to say, credibility in multilateral institutions is not the primary aim of
Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) policy. The MOFA has also
noted Japan’s desire to facilitate community-building, stability and prosperity in
East Asia.76 For the ﬁrst time since the Paciﬁc War, Japan is seriously attempting
to transform its economic capital into political and diplomatic capital; FTAs are
the enzymes in this process of conversion.
With three agreements in eﬀect, and several others in various stages of negotiation, Japan has entered the FTA age at full force. Technically speaking, Japan has
entered the EPA age, which seeks deeper forms of integration in selected areas.77
This section ﬁrst examines the EPAs with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia, and
then takes up Japan’s ongoing negotiations.
3.2.1. Japan-Singapore New Age Economic Partnership78
In what has become a standard trend among East Asian countries, Japan chose
a comparatively minor trading partner to initiate its EPA strategy. Singapore
made a sensible choice for several reasons, not the least of which was its virtually non-existent agricultural sector.79 Singapore’s advanced markets,80 FTA
73)

H. Saburi, ‘The GATT/WTO and Regional Integration’, 44 Japanese Annual International Law
(2001) p. 77.
74)
S. M. Pekkanen, ‘Bilateralism, Multilateralism, or Regionalism? Japan’s Trade Forum Choices’,
5 Journal of East Asian Studies (2005) pp. 92, 95.
75)
See Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan, Japan’s FTA Strategy (Summary), <www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/economy/fta/strategy0210.html>, (hereinafter Japan’s FTA Straetgy).
76)
See Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan, Basic Policy Towards Further Promotion of Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Article 1-1, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/policy0412. html>.
77)
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) diﬀer from FTAs chieﬂy in their scope. FTAs, strictu
sensu, aim to eliminate tariﬀs only on goods and services. EPAs aim for deeper integration of the
two economies, and may provide for intellectual property rights, free movement of persons and
labour, investment mechanisms, educational and scientiﬁc exchange. See Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Investment (METI), Japan’s Policy on FTAs/EPAs, March 2005; T. Aso, ‘The Hallmarks
of Economic Diplomacy for Japan’, speech delivered at the National Press Club of Japan, 8 March
2006, <www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0603.html>.
78)
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership
(hereinafter JSEPA), 13 January 2002.
79)
Even so, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing acquiesced to the Singapore
agreement only after considerable “foot-dragging” to placate agricultural interests. See E. S. Krauss,
‘The US, Japan, and Trade Liberalization: From Bilateralism to Regional Multilateralism to
Regionalism’, 16 Paciﬁc Review (2003) p. 320.
80)
Ibid., p. 319.
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experience81 and strong intellectual property regime persuaded Japanese oﬃcials
that the agreement would make a good “learning experience”.
JSEPA encapsulates several features of Japan’s grander economic policy. It aims
to heighten Japan’s regional presence by exporting ﬁnancial and technological
expertise to key Southeast Asian players. Though a bilateral agreement, JSEPA
envisions Japanese involvement with the rest of Southeast Asia,82 particularly
countries with nascent capital markets.83 It also incorporates a wide range of cooperative measures in investment, information technology, tourism, science and
technology, human resources development and education. This is a wide-ranging
plan for such a small partner-country, but reﬂects Japan’s grand ambitions to
integrate across geographic and strategic borders.
3.2.2. Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement
In 2004, Japan signed its ﬁrst, and perhaps only, EPA with a non-Asian state.
Availing itself of Mexico’s own intricate FTA network of 43 countries, Japan
gained tariﬀ-free access to key European, North American and South American
markets.84 This is as far as Japan needs to go in the Americas. Mexico beneﬁts
from lower tariﬀs on Japan’s USD 60 billion food industry.85 It also hopes to get
an investment boost, though this seems unlikely in light of Japan’s heavy investment in Southeast Asia. Japan would prefer to consummate EPAs with its existing
production lines in Southeast Asia rather than create new ones in North America.
Nevertheless, after a year in eﬀect, both Japan and Mexico have both seen signiﬁcant increases in bilateral trade, with Japan doing slightly better.86
3.2.3. Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement
After two years of negotiation, the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership
Agreement entered into force in July 2006. Japan’s decades of economic engagement with Malaysia are well represented. The EPA progressively eliminates tariﬀs

81)
Singapore signed its ﬁrst FTA with New Zealand in November 2000. Since then, it has signed
agreements with 13 other countries, including Canada, European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
and the US. See Ministry of Trade and Industry – Singapore, Singapore’s FTA Network: Expanding
Markets, Connecting Partners, <www.iesingapore.gov.sg/wps/portal/!ut/p/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0x
PLMnMz0v M0Y_QjzKLN4g3C_UFSYGY5oFm-pFoYo4YImah3phiIWEIMV-P_NxU_SB9b
_0A_YLc0NDQ iHJHAAF8_pE!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNElVRS82Xz
Bf NlRV>.
82)
JSEPA, Preamble (“enhancing economic ties between the Parties would strengthen Japan’s
involvement in Southeast Asia”).
83)
Ibid., Article 1(b)(i).
84)
See T. Miyazaki, ‘Envoy: Japan-Mexico partnership beneﬁcial’, Daily Yomiuri, 5 April 2006.
85)
‘Japan’s parliament ratiﬁes free trade pact with Mexico’, Agence France Presse – English,
10 November 2004.
86)
See Miyazaki, supra note 84 (noting Mexican exports increased by 30 percent and Japanese
exports by 40 percent during the ﬁrst ten months).
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on automobiles and auto parts, bearing the unmistakable stamp of the car
industry. For its part, Malaysia will receive a much needed technological and
ﬁnancial boost to modernise its aging factories. The agreement eliminates tariﬀs
on 97 percent of the value of bilateral trade,87 including agricultural products,
ﬁsheries, footwear, rubber and textiles. This is good training for the Japanese
agricultural sector, which will face even severer competition if and when other
agreements with other countries materialise.
Like the others, the Japan-Malaysia agreement aims for cooperation across
various sectors. Japan is concerned about the protection of investment and intellectual property rights, while Malaysia looks forward to deepening the “socioeconomic partnership”.88 An example of the latter was announced last October,
when Japan agreed to open a “Skills Training Centre” in Shah Alam, 15 miles
west of Kuala Lumpur. The centre will train “master trainers” in the latest automotive technologies developed in Japan; they will in turn go back to their companies and instruct colleagues.89 The footprint of the Japanese automobile industry
is once again apparent, giving Malaysia a slight edge vis-à-vis its regional
competitors: Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
3.2.4. Japan’s EPA Future
Japanese EPA diplomacy shows no sign of slowing. The present focus is to conclude
the ongoing negotiations with Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan
has had several rounds of discussions with each country, but cannot convince
Southeast Asian auto manufacturers to phase out tariﬀs on Japanese cars and auto
components.90 Nevertheless, one of these agreements is likely to be Japan’s next.91

4. East Asian FTAs
For the past ﬁve years, China and Japan have sown the seeds of regional integration
through far-reaching FTA diplomacy. Attention to these new forms of international
87)

‘Japan Hopes for Better Economic Ties with Malaysia via JMEPA’, Malaysia Economic News,
2 October 2006.
88
) Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Malaysia for an Economic
Partnership, 13 December 2005, Article 1(b)–(d).
89)
‘Japanese-Style “Train the Trainer” Centre for Local Auto Sector’, Malaysian Economic News,
21 October 2006.
90)
See e.g. A. Jaiimsin, ‘Thailand-Japan pact could damage auto-parts industry’, Bangkok Post,
26 February 2007; ‘Indonesia to exempt duty on Japanese auto parts’, People’s Daily Online, 24
August 2006; Brieﬁng Paper on the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), prepared by the oﬃce of Rep. Teddy Casiño, pp. 2, 3, <www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/ JPEPA_brieﬁng
_Paper-ﬁnal.pdf>.
91)
The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan, Japan’s Eﬀorts on Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA), <globalwarming.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/eﬀort.pdf>, (hereinafter Japan’s Eﬀorts).
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economic law sheds light on the current boom, and helps illuminate the possibility
of future regional integration. A brief overview of the relevant WTO provisions on
free trade agreements will help situate the discussion.
4.1. The WTO and FTAs
As WTO members, China and Japan must abide by certain obligations before
establishing free trade agreements. In addition to notifying the WTO,92 they
must satisfy three requirements.93 First, the elimination of duties and other restrictions must apply to “substantially all the trade” between countries.94 Second,
restrictions on trade with countries outside of the FTA cannot be higher than they
were “prior to the formation of the free-trade area”.95 Third, the formation of the
FTA must take place “within a reasonable period of time”.96 As a developing
country, China may avail itself of the less onerous standards articulated in the
Enabling Clause.97
By and large, Chinese and Japanese FTAs liberate substantially all trade, though
Japan adheres to this standard somewhat more strictly. Japanese FTAs consistently exceed the de facto standard of 90 percent of trade in goods, with no economic sectors entirely excepted.98 Japan’s EPAs eliminated tariﬀs on 98 percent of
trade with Singapore,99 94 percent with Mexico and 95 percent with Malaysia.100
Japan has also agreed to do so within the generally accepted “reasonable period”
of ten years.101
China has also taken the requirement seriously. The agreements with ASEAN
and Chile both eliminate tariﬀs on 90 percent of trade in goods within a decade.
The agreement with Pakistan, by contrast, does not extend quite so far, in eﬀect

92)
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (hereinafter GATT), Article XXIV(7)(a).
93)
See S. M. Cone, III, ‘The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-FavoredNation Treatment and “Imperial Preference”’, 26 Michigan Journal International Law (2005) p. 6.
94)
GATT, Article XXIV (8)(b).
95)
Ibid., Article XXIV (5)(b).
96)
Ibid., Article XXIV (5)(c).
97)
See Diﬀerential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, 28 November 1979 (permitting developing countries to “accord diﬀerential
and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other”
members).
98)
See M. Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2003) pp. 359, 360.
99)
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Overview of Japan’s International Situation and Japanese Diplomacy,
2004, p. 34, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap1.pdf>.
100)
See ‘Japan Hopes for Better Economic Ties with Malaysia via JMEPA’, supra note 88.
101)
See e.g. ‘Malaysia, Japan to Hold Meeting to Enhance Economic Ties’, Asia Pulse, 11 July 2006
(noting elimination of imports duties on textiles and fruit immediately, on rubber products and
plastics within eight years and on chemicals, steel and automotive parts within ten years).
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aspiring to reach 90 percent, but concretely providing for only 85 percent.
Nevertheless, given that Pakistan and China can avail themselves of the lower
standards dictated by the Enabling Clause, this still represents an impressive
eﬀort. Again, only time will tell how closely China and Pakistan actually get to
“substantially all the trade”.
4.2. Chinese and Japanese FTAs
China and Japan have evinced diﬀerent and, to a certain extent, competitive
strategies in adapting international economic law to political and diplomatic prerogatives. Scholars have noted the tension generated in Tokyo when Beijing signs
an FTA, and vice versa.102 With each new agreement, China and Japan augment
their regional stature.
China has taken pains to accommodate the expectations of partner countries.
Chile, as its previous FTAs show,103 prefers orthodox, comprehensive FTAs,
focusing almost exclusively on goods. Accordingly, the China-Chile FTA covers
primarily trade in goods, and has few of the innovations apparent in other
FTAs. On the other hand, ﬂexibility is the operative word in the China-Pakistan
FTA, which defers key FTA elements – such as which products to lower tariﬀs
on – to later negotiations. This kind of uncertainty would be anathema to the
comprehensive approach generally favoured in Western FTAs.
The China-ASEAN FTA proves to be the most interesting as a specimen of
international economic law. The “ASEAN Way” of incremental consensus-building
emerges as the key characteristic in the ongoing expansion of this agreement.
After learning how to cooperate with ASEAN through a decade of political and
security initiatives, China has agreed to operate by its cardinal diplomatic principle.
With each new annex that China and ASEAN add, the relationship deepens,
dispelling Southeast Asian anxieties about the “China threat”.
Japan has shown a more orthodox approach to free trade agreements, though
not woodenly so. Decades of investment and involvement in Southeast Asia have
paved the way for Japan’s ﬁrst wave of EPAs in that region. This will not only help
Japan’s key industries (automobile and electronics) acclimate to increased global
competition (including China), it could also lead to new forms of regional
cooperation, as the training school planned for Shah Alam demonstrates.
102)

See S. S. Kim, ‘Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia’, 4 Journal of East Asian Studies
(2004) p. 51.
103)
Chile’s FTAs with Canada (1997), Mexico (1999), Costa Rica (2002), El Salvador (2002), the
US (2004), Chile (2004) and the European Free Trade Association (2004) have all covered trade
in goods and services. They were, moreover, notiﬁed to the WTO under the more restrictive provisions of GATT XXIV and GATS V, and not the more liberal Enabling Clause. See J. Crawford and
R. V. Fiorentino, ‘The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements’, WTO Discussion Paper
No. 8, 2005, pp. 29–33, <www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers8_e.pdf>.
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Indeed, Japan’s new international economic law is most interesting when it
deviates most widely from the meat and potatoes of goods and services. For
instance, what kind of scientiﬁc and educational opportunities will the EPA with
Malaysia lead to? How can Japanese expertise in the ﬁnancial services and capital
markets sectors be exported to Thailand? What kind of measures will Japan adopt
to allow Filipina nurses and caregivers into Japan? In honing its FTA practices,
Japan is closely re-evaluating opportunities and the strengths of its relationships
with various “benefactor states” in Southeast Asia.

5. Conclusion
Since 2002, a new wave of regional integration has swept East Asia. In their own
ways, China and Japan have promoted economic regionalisation through a wide
array of FTAs/EPAs that crisscross the Asia-Paciﬁc. This movement has multiple
motivations, including the protectionism of regional eﬀorts elsewhere, heightened competitiveness in numerous sectors and the realisation that interdependency is, quite literally, the way of the world. In addition, the FTA explosion is
closely tied to the emerging contest for regional leadership by China and Japan.
Both countries have assumed an FTA/EPA strategy that links previous diplomatic
eﬀorts with current economic mandates. While both countries are eager to be the
regional hub, it is not clear whether this desire will spark a region-wide free trade
agreement, or a continued streak of bilateralism. In all likelihood, only when a
signiﬁcant number of China’s and Japan’s FTA partners overlap will a regional free
trade agreement be imaginable. Alternatively, a neutral third party such as Korea
may step in to bridge the diﬀerences.

